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Case Comment
KNOWLES V. ANCHORAGE HOLDINGS Co. LTD. (1964), 46 W.W.R. 173,
43 D.L.R. (2d) 300-CONTRACT-SALE OF GOODS--EXCLUSION OF CON-
DITIONS AND WARRANTIES-BREACH OF FUNDAMENTAL TERM-RIGHT
TO DAMAGES DESPITE EXEMPTION CLAUSE.-In Knowles v. Anchorage
HoZdings Co. Ltd.,' the Supreme Court of B.C. was faced with the
problem of interpreting the effectiveness of an exemption clause in
a Sale of Goods contract where a diesel boat engine supplied by the
seller was so defective that, in effect, the seller supplied something
different from that which was contracted for. The Court had also to
consider the effect of a provision in the contract of sale that the
buyer was relying on his own judgment. The term was designed to
preclude the implied conditions as to quality or fitness of s. 20(a) of
the British Columbia SaZe of Goods Act.2 The buyer used the engine
for six of the fourteen months during which he retained it prior to
bringing the action.
Verchere J. held that the seller (the defendant) supplied some-
thing so different from that contracted for that it amounted to a
breach of a fundamental term of the contract of sale which rendered
the exempting clause ineffective. The learned judge also held that
s. 20 (a) of the Sale of Goods Act 3 did not apply as the complaint of
the buyer was not as to the sufficiency or adequacy of the engine but
rather that it did not function as an engine should. The buyer was
entitled to claim damages although he had not repudiated the con-
tract or lost the right to terminate despite the fact that the buyer used
the engine for six months.
The facts of the case are as follows. In July, 1962, the plaintiff
visited the president of the defendant company regarding the
purchase of an engine for his boat. It was the defendant com-
pany's business, inter aZia, to sell engines. On July 18, 1962, the plain-
tiff ordered a 3M Ceriist Diesel complete with certain fittings for a
total price of $3,045.57. The learned judge found4 as a fact that the
defendant knew of the purpose for which the plaintiff required the
engine (to salvage and tow logs) and that the plaintiff relied on the
seller's skill and judgment.
Knowles received the engine by August 15, 1962. Immediately
trouble developed and he was forced to return the engine to the
company several times for repairs. In addition, new parts had to be
installed. In October, 1962, Knowles removed the engine from his
boat and gave it to the company for additional repairs. He did not
use the engine again until June, 1963. When he then used the engine
he found that its performance remained unsatisfactory. Lubricating
oil was somehow allowed to enter the combustion chamber, and re-
sulted in the burning of excessive amounts of oil. This necessitated
1 (1964), 46 W.W.R. 173, 43 D.L.R. (2d) 300.
2 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 344, s. 20(a); a parallel provision in Ontario is found in
the Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 358, s. 15(1).
3 Ibid.
4 (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 300 at 301.
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the frequent addition of extra oil and proper oil pressure could not
be maintained. Due to improper combustion the engine would not
operate under load at a speed high enough to permit it to use its
rated horsepower. The engine did not work properly despite the
expenditure by the seller of between $800-$900. The learned judge
found5 that the defendant had ample time to remedy the defects and
that the defects remained. Thereupon the buyer sought damages.
In dealing with the effect of the exemption clause upon s. 20 of
the Sale of Goods Act 6 the learned judge referred to the Canadian
case of Hayes Mfg. Co. v. Perdue & Cope7 as authority for the propo-
sition that a clause in a contract expressly excluding all conditions
and warranties not therein set forth does not entitle the vendor to
supply something different from that which was bargained for. There-
upon the learned judge introduces the concept of fundamental breach
by quoting Crossley Vaines on Personal Property,8
... this freedom of contract preserved by the Act is subject to the so.
called doctrine of fundamental breach, namely that an exempting clause
may nowadays be held governed by the overriding proviso that it only
avails to exempt a party when he is carrying out his contract: not when
he goes outside its four corners by breaking a fundamental term.
It was then necessary to determine whether the engine delivered
was in fact the thing contracted for. After repeating the difficulties
to which the plaintiff was subjected as a result of the defective engine,
the learned judge quoted Lord Dunedin's remarks in W. & S. Pollockc
&. Co. v. Macrae:9
Now, when there is such a congeries of defects as to destroy the work-
able character of the machine, I think this amounts to a total breach of
contract, and that each defect cannot be taken by itself separately so
as to apply the provisions of the conditions of guarantee and make It
impossible to claim damages.
This proposition was verified by quoting words to the same effect
from the judgment of Holroyd Pearce, L.J. in Yeoman Credit Ltd. v.
Apps.10 Charterhouse Credit Co. v. Tolly" was referred to as author-
ity for the proposition that there could be a breach of a fundamental
term although the condition could have been made good at consid-
erable expense. The learned judge then concluded that there was a
breach of a fundamental term to provide an engine of workable
character.
The defendant's submission that the plaintiff's expressed reliance
qn his own judgment predluded any of the implied terms of s. 20 of
the Sale of Goods Act 2 from arising was dismissed thus:
5 Id. at 302.
6 Supra, footnote 2.
7 [1931] 2 D.L.R. 610, 43 B.C.R. 545.8 Crossley Vaines, Personal Property, 3rd ed., 1962, pp. 295, 296.
9 [1922] S.C.(H.L.) 192 at 200.
10 [1961] 2 All E.R. 281 at 289.
11 [1963] 2 All E.R. 432.
12 Supra, footnote 2.
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The answer lies in my opinion in the lack of any inconsistency between
the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's skill or judgment to provide
an engine that would meet the fundamental obligation of an engine of
workable character and his reliance on his own judgment that a properly
performing engine of the capacity supplied would be suitable for his
purpose.13
The plaintiff's "acceptance" of the engine and any subsequent
denial of his rights to claim damages was dismissed on the basis of
Donovan, L.J.'s remarks in Charterhouse Credit Co. v. Tolly'4 to the
effect that it was significant that the House of Lords, in deciding
cases1 5 similar to the one at bar, never considered the "acceptance"
by a buyer a valid reason for denying the buyer damages where the
seller was in breach of a fundamental term of the contract. Massey-
Harris Co. v. Skeldingl6 was cited as authority for awarding damages
in the case of a breach of contract where otherwise it would be too
late for the buyer to claim rescission. In that case the Supreme Court
of Canada 17 held that damages would be the amount of the full pur-
chase price.
The Knowles case represents in part the adoption in Canada of
the doctrine of breach of fundamental term as expounded by the
English courts in recent years. This doctrine has developed from a
dictum of DeVlin J. in Smeaton Hanscomb & Co. Ltd. v. Sassoon I.
Setty18 where that learned justice defined a fundamental obligation
as "something fundamental to the whole contract, so that if it is not
complied with, the performance becomes totally different from that
which the contract contemplates."
This is not a new doctrine, but has been in existance for many
years.19 This use of the doctrine as a weapon against exemption
clauses is, however, of fairly recent vintage. As Cheshire and Fifoot
state:
•.. in comparatively recent years it has been generalized so as to counter
the undue rise of exemption clauses in any type of contract.20
As far back as 1834, Lord Abinger said:
If you contract to sell peas you cannot oblige a party to take beans. If
the description of the article tendered is different in any respect it is not
the article bargained for and the other party is not obliged to take it.21
One could go back as far as 181222 and find that where the description
in a lease did not correspond to the actual condition of the land, the
lease was void.
13 (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 300 at 304 per Verchere J..
14 Supra, pp. 438, 439 per Donovan L.J..
15 Donovan L.J. referred to Poflock & Co. v. Macrae, supra, and Walis
Son and We~ls v. Pratt & Haynes, [1911] A.C. 394.
16 [19341 3 D.L.R. 193, [1934] S.C.R. 432.
17 [1934] 3 D.L.R. at 194, [19341 S.C.R. at 435 per Duff C.J.C..
18 [1953] 2 All E.R. 1471 at 1473.
19 See Anson, Law of Contract, Guest 22 ed., 1964, p. 153.
20 Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contracts, 6th ed., p. 117.
21 Chanter v. Hopkins (1834), 4 M. & W. 399 at 404; see also Bowes v.
Shand, [1877] 2 A.C. 456 at 480 per Lord Blackburn.
22 Jones v. Edney (1812), 3 Campb. 284, 170 E.R. 1384.
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The cases indicate that Canadian Courts have applied similar
reasoning to the type of problem raised in the Knowles case. The
British Columbia Supreme Court could have arrived at a similar
decision without specifically referring to the modem English cases.
Cases such as Hayes Mfg. Co. v. Perdue &, Cope,23 Massey-Harris Co.
Ltd. v. Skelding24 (which were cited in the Knowles case) and Alabas-
tine Co. of Paris Ltd. v. Canada Producer and Gas Engine Co.25 indi-
cate that an exemption clause will not permit a seller to provide goods
of such inferior quality that the purchaser would, in effect, receive
goods of a totally different nature from those which he contracted to
buy. In Cork v. Greavette Boats Ltd.,26 a case of a sale of a faulty
engine in which the seller sought to rely on an exemption clause,
Greene J. after referring to the Alabastine27 case and other English
cases, said, ". . . in all these cases there was a fundamental failure in
the article supplied which went to the substance of the Contract."28
(Italics mine). It must be remembered, however, that the Canadian
cases adopted the principle of breach of fundamental term from the
English cases on sale of goods. These English cases in turn adopted
their reasoning from sale of land transactions and shipping cases
involving deviation from course.29
Exculpatory clauses will not avail a seller who has not lived up
to his fundamental contractual obligations. The problem is how to
distinguish fundamental terms from those that are merely collateral.
Montrose has stated that an
... autonomic policy underlines the doctrine of fundamental terms. The
parties themselves distinguish between terms which are fundamental ....
terms which are 'definitive' of the goods and terms which do not have
this fundamental quality even though they may operate as conditions or
promises.30
Melville has referred to conditions and warranties as "desirable or
cdllateral provisions, express or implied".31 These provisions are sub-
sidiary to the main purpose of the contract. On the other hand there
are three fundamental terms.32 These include the parties to the con-
tract, the price or consideration and the main purpose or core of
the contract. This list is not, however, all inclusive. Regard must be
had to the intentions of the parties and the circumstances surround-
ing the making of the contract.
To establish a breach of a fundamental term, which vitiates the
operation of the vendor's exculpatory clause, the purchaser must
23 Supra, footnote 7.
24 Supra, footnote 16.
25 (1914), 300 L.R. 394.
26 [1940] O.R. 352.
27 Supra, footnote 25.
28 Id. at 395.
29 See F. M. B. Reynolds, Warranty, Condition and Fundamental Term,
79 L.Q.R. 534 at 546 where the deviation theory is criticized. See also Cross-
ley Vaines, Personal Property, at 295-296 (cited in the Knowles case).
30 J. L. Montrose, Some Problems about Fundamental Terms, 1964 C.L.J.
at 264.




prove the breach was of a flagrant nature.33 It has been held34 that
minor breaches collectively considered constitute a fundamental
breach of contract. "The inability of a thing to function in the way
intended is considered a breach of an implied term. '35
The effectiveness of the Knowles case is weakened by the learned
judge's failure to state in precise terms the factors which lead to his
finding of the fundamental breach. Verchere J. found a fundamental
breach of contract when he considered collectively the following
factors:
(a) the inconvenience and bother to which the purchaser was
subjected as a result of purchasing an engine with what
appears to be "incurable" defects,
(b) the defects themselves,
(c) the loss of income attributable to the inefficient working of
the engine.
It is noted that the learned judge compared the efficiency of the old
engine and the income that engine gave the purchaser with the effi-
ciency and income derived from the new engine.
The case law indicates that the court in using its discretion will
find a fundamental breach if, from the facts of the case, the defects
of the goods seem flagrant. The cost of repairing the goods appears
to be irrelevant.
When construing exemption clauses the courts have been bound
by such rules of construction as the "Main Purpose" rule which
states that a party to a contract cannot exempt himself from a failure
to perform the main purpose of the contract and the "Four Corners"
rule which provides that any liability for damage sought to be covered
by exemption clauses must fall within the four corners of the contract
and not outside it. The ejusdem generis rule and the contra preferen-
teum rules are also used by the courts in strictly construing the
exemption clause, usually in favor of the buyer. It would seem that
the doctrine of breach of a fundamental term is merely another way
of phrasing the idea contained in the "Main Purpose" and "Four Cor-
ners" rules. Where an article supplied is so defective as to be in
essence a different article than that contracted for, it would be con-
sidered a breach of a fundamental term, as it was here, or alterna-
tively to be a failure to perform the main purpose of the contract, or
to fall outside of the four corners of the contract.
The rule may be said to be founded upon some "principle of jus-
tice"36 or upon some grounds of public policy which declares that:
33 Schmidt v. Intermationa Harvester Co. of Canada Ltd. (1962), 38
W.W.R. 180.
34 Yeoman Credit Ltd. vi. Apps, supra, footnote 10; W. & S. Poilock c Co.
v. Macrae, supra, footnote 9.
35 Melville, supra, footnote 31.
36 Montrose, op. cit., p. 67.
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... the intention of the parties is subordinate to higher considerations ofjustice. The policy is not confined to doctrines such as those of illegality,
based on the conduct of the parties entering into the contract but extends
to the regulation of the consequences to the parties after they have
entered into the contract. This is the heteronomic concept which under-
lines the doctrine of fundamental breach.37
Indeed, "the doctrine of fundamental breach does offer the public a
new hope of protection against injustices perpetrated by abuse of
contract".3
8
Some learned writers have claimed that fundamental breach
must be specially pleaded.39 It is interesting to note that in the
Knowles case, fundamental breach was not pleaded by the plaintiff
(buyer). The plaintiff sought damages for breach of an implied con-
dition of the Sale of Goods Act or alternatively that the engine was
not delivered as specified. The defendant-seller sought to rely on the
exemption clause and the buyer's admission of reliance upon his (the
buyer's) own judgment. Nonetheless, Verchere J. found there was
a breach of a fundamental term. It is not clear whether he based his
finding upon the plaintiff's alternative claim that the engine was
not delivered as specified or whether he employed the "heteronomic"
theory of Montrose. It could be argued that the engine was not deliv-
ered as specified. This, it is submitted, would be in breach of the
Sale of Goods Act which provides, inter alia, that the seller must
deliver goods in accordance with the contract of sale. However, no
mention of this section of the Sale of Goods Act was to be found in
the Knowles case. Therefore, we could assume that as a matter of
public policy the learned judge would not allow the seller of what
the judge found to be defective goods, to rely on the exemption
clause in the contract of sale regardless of whether breach of a
fundamental term was pleaded or not.
In conclusion, we can agree with Devlin J. who said that a
fundamental term is "something less than a condition". 40 It is the
very pith and substance of a contract. In analysing the concept of
fundamental terms, in earlier years the courts adopted rules of con-
struction to vitiate the harshness of exemption clauses. In modern
times, the courts have used the same doctrine, but this time clothed
in the image of public policy or rule of law, to achieve the same result.
Regardless which method is employed, the consumer is afforded
protection.
IRVIN H. SHERMAN
37 Id. p. 264.
38 A. G. Guest, Fundamental Breach of Contract, 77 L.Q.R. 118.
39 See Hunt & Winterbottom (West of England) Ltd. 'v. B.R.S. (Parcels)
Ltd., [19621 1 All E.R. 111.
40 Smeaton Hanscomb & Co. Ltd. v. Sassoon I. Setty, Son & Co., [19531
2 All E.R. 1471 at 1473.
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